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7China to compromise on borders. Shi says that given the 
increased competition between Washington and Beijing, 
India’s attitude towards the two powers will be decisive 
in defining the geopolitics of Eurasia in the twenty-first 
century.
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Russian influence in Mongolia began to decline after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, China has 
become the most important player in Mongolia’s economic 
development. China is Mongolia’s leading trading partner 
and the main focus of its diplomacy. However, the 
relationship is asymmetric: Mongolia is not a priority for 
China, as evidenced by the limited academic literature 
written on the subject in China.19 Instead, Mongolia 
12 Wei Lisu is a professor in the Department of International Politics, 
Central China Normal University in Wuhan, Hubei province. He 
specialises in Mongolia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Xia Anling 
is a professor of Marxism at the Huazhong Normal University, Hubei.
13 Wu Yun is a PhD student at Inner Mongolia University.
14 Zhang Haixia is a graduate of Heilongjiang University, Harbin, who 
specialises in relations between China and the former Soviet bloc. 
15 Wang Cong is a researcher on Central Asia at the China Institutes of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).
16 Wang Zhaobin is a senior reporter for the Chinese review, Energy 
(“能源” 杂志), specialising in coal and renewable energies.
17 Yan Xiaodong is an honorary research fellow at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS).
18 Ta Kung Pao is China’s oldest newspaper, founded in 1902. It is based 
in Hong Kong and financed by the Chinese Communist Party, and it is 
generally considered to be a mouthpiece for the country’s leadership. 
19 The article by Wei Lisu and Xia Anling points out that between 1992 
and 2013, the CICR published only 11 articles on Mongolia, with the 
leading Chinese academic journal, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi – World 
Economics and Politics, publishing only two. The research centre most 
active in dealing with the subject is the Institute of Northeast Asian 
Studies, Jilin University. 
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The special relationship is reflected in the two countries’ 
close economic ties. Zhang Haixia notes that the countries’ 
economies are complementary: Mongolia has the raw 
materials that China needs, but to exploit them effectively, 
it needs Chinese technology and capital investment. Wu 
Yun writes that China has benefited enormously from 
Mongolia’s greater economic openness and from its 
willingness to reduce its dependence on Russia. Moreover, 
Mongolia’s move away from Russia has allowed it to 
dramatically increase its external trade, albeit at the cost 
of greater dependence on China, which has become its 
key trade partner since 1999. Trade with China enabled 
Mongolia to reach an annual trade surplus of $2.1 billion 
in 2012, representing nearly 15 percent of its GDP. Raw 
materials such as coal and, to a lesser extent, wood and 
animal products, were Mongolia’s most important exports. 
The trade in raw materials is also crucial to some Chinese 
regions. For example, raw materials account for 52 percent 
of Inner Mongolia’s external trade.
Wu Yun says that Chinese industry has a strong foothold 
in Mongolia: 5,303 Chinese companies were registered in 
2010, representing almost 50 percent of the total number 
of foreign companies in the country. Direct investment 
is sizeable: China’s investment in Mongolia was worth 
$24 billion in 2010, accounting for 51 percent of Mongolia’s 
total foreign investment. China’s closest competitors in 
foreign investment were Canada, with 8 percent of total 
foreign investment, the Netherlands, with 6.1 percent, and 
South Korea, with 5.3 percent. The other “great powers” 
invest very little in the country. Even Burma has put more 
money into Mongolia than have Russia and the US.
The special economic and trade relationship between 
Mongolia and China has had a significant and positive 
impact on Mongolia’s economy. The economy has 
experienced double-digit growth rates since the end of 
the last decade. However, Mongolia’s dependence on the 
Chinese market also makes it vulnerable. For example, the 
World Bank lowered its 2013 growth forecast for Mongolia 
from 16.5 percent to 12.5 percent because of a 24-percent 
drop in China’s demand for coal over the first nine months 
of 2013. 
represents an economic opportunity, mainly useful to 
China as a source of raw materials.20
China has complex and tense relations with its littoral 
neighbours, from Japan to the Philippines and Vietnam. By 
comparison, Mongolia seems to be the perfect neighbour. 
The economies of the two states complement each other. 
Mongolia has no disputes with China over the two countries’ 
shared 4,710km border, and the country presents no threat 
to China’s national security. The articles leave out the 
historical border dispute between China the Soviet Union 
over the current PRC-Mongolia border. They also ignore 
past claims to complete sovereignty over Mongolia from 
the Republic of China and from the PRC, particularly from 
some members of the Chinese military. 
Mongolia is ready and willing to offer its services as a 
mediator, especially on North Korea, and has no desire to 
align itself openly with any great power. Even so, China 
has become concerned that Mongolia is moving closer to 
the United States and Japan, as a result of the US effort 
to reposition itself in the Asia-Pacific region and of Japan’s 
proactive diplomacy with regard to Mongolia. 
The post-Soviet honeymoon period
Wei Lisu and Xia Anling review the history of recent China-
Mongolia relations. Mongolia became a satellite of the USSR 
after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of Mongolia 
in 1924. But Mongolia stopped prioritising relations with 
Russia in 1994. Officially, its leadership spoke of diversifying 
diplomatic relations, but unofficially, their intention was to 
focus on relations with China. Mongolia and China signed 
a “good-neighbour partnership of mutual trust” (睦邻互信
伙伴关系, mulin huxin huoban guanxi) in 2003 during a 
state visit to Mongolia by China’s President Hu Jintao. The 
alliance was elevated to a strategic partnership in 2011. 
Since then, bilateral meetings have increased in frequency, 
and China has become Mongolia’s chief political partner.21 
20 Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that the website of the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Chinese Embassy 
to Mongolia, available at http://mn.mofcom.gov.cn/, is updated frequently, 
unlike that of the embassy itself. 
21 In 2013, top Chinese officials Wu Bangguo and Yang Jiechi visited 
Mongolia, in January and May respectively. The Mongolian and Chinese 
presidents met in June on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Chinese Defence Minister 
Chang Wanquan visited Mongolia in September and Mongolian Prime 
Minister Norovyn Altankhuyag came to Beijing in October. 
Table: China’s share of Mongolia’s trade
Source: Wu Yun, “Exploratory study of China-Mongolia economic and trade relations in the twenty-first century”, 
Guoji yanjiu cankao – International Study Reference, No. 8, 2013.
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9Structural limitations on Chinese influence
China faces some structural barriers to increasing its 
influence in Mongolia. Wu Yun points out that competition 
for access to Mongolia’s raw materials has increased, with 
Russia, Japan, and South Korea all seeking a share in 
Mongolian resources. In August 2011, South Korea signed 
a plan for cooperation with Mongolia on mineral extraction, 
and several foreign mining companies are already present 
in the Mongolian mining industry. 
Wu says that the form of Chinese investment is a problem. 
Foreign investment projects are few in number, but each of 
them is substantial. Anglo-Australian mining companies 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, for instance, have made large 
investments in the country’s mineral sector, notably in the 
huge Tolgoi coal mine. Chinese investments in the sector 
have tended to be relatively small, even if they are now 
growing. This has stopped China from having a presence 
in the larger mining projects. Equally damaging, Chinese 
investments have not been strategically focused, especially 
in comparison to those of Russia. Russia is responsible for 
less than 2 percent of Mongolia’s total foreign investment. 
But it is a key stakeholder in the joint venture Ulaanbaatar 
Railway Joint Stock Company, which owns 90 percent of 
Mongolia’s rail transport. Russia has a 49 percent share in 
the Erdenet Mining Corporation, which controls most of 
Mongolia’s copper and rare earth metals. And it holds 49 
percent of Oriental Uranium, the main uranium extraction 
company in Mongolia. These investments give Russia a 
privileged position in Mongolia’s strategic sectors.
All the authors agree that the investment climate for mining 
development in Mongolia needs to be improved. Wu Yun 
says that Mongolian law is complex and volatile. The 
adoption of a law on foreign investment (外资控制法, waizi 
kongzhi fa) in July 2012 made things even less clear. Wang 
Zhaobin says that Mongolia has regulations restricting 
the importation of Chinese labour. This limit caused the 
massive mining and aluminium producer, the Aluminum 
Corporation of China (CHALCO), to suspend its investment 
programmes in the country.
Zhang Haixia points out other barriers to economic 
cooperation. Mongolia has poor connecting infrastructure 
at customs and border posts and its rail network is old and 
inadequate. But the country’s low population density, under 
2 inhabitants per km², necessitates a relatively high level 
of infrastructure for ventures to succeed. Meanwhile, the 
country has a small internal market, with only 2.9 million 
inhabitants, limiting the potential for trade.22 
Initiatives to increase cooperation
Given these structural limitations, some of the authors 
think that China should rethink its economic relations with 
22 By comparison, Inner Mongolia alone has 4 million citizens who are 
ethnic Mongolians. 
Mongolia. Wu Yun says Chinese companies must improve 
their image in the country by paying more attention to the 
environmental and human dimensions of their activities 
in Mongolia. They could, for example, increase people-
to-people exchanges.23 During Mongolian Prime Minister 
Norovyn Altankhuyag’s visit to Beijing on 22-26 October 
2013, a new protocol was signed to add to the 2011 strategic 
partnership agreement. China’s President Xi Jinping 
stressed three key points, which Wu Yun describes as 
a “triangle of cooperation” (三位一体、统筹推进, sanwei 
yiti, tongchou tuijin). Xi spoke of the need to establish 
better cooperation in the development of the mining 
sector in Mongolia, greater development of infrastructure 
between the two countries, and more substantial financial 
cooperation. 
Wang Cong thinks one good way to encourage 
cooperation could be “the Silk Road Economic Belt” 
(丝绸之路经济带, sichou zhi lu jingji dai), which 
Xi Jinping first 
spoke of in a speech 
in September 2013 
at Nazarbayev 
University in 
Kazakhstan. In 
another speech on 
24 October 2013, 
the president 
spoke of the 
importance of 
economic policy 
in the stabilisation of China’s neighbourhood.24 Mongolia 
was not initially included in the Chinese conceptualisation 
of the Silk Road Economic Belt. However, it joined the 
initiative at the end of 2013 through the efforts of the 
Mongolian government, particularly during the prime 
minister’s visit in October, and of the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China’s State Council, 
which organised a working conference on the subject in 
November.25
China’s concerns about Mongolia’s “third 
neighbour” strategy
Former US Secretary of State James Baker coined the 
phrase “third neighbour” (第三邻国, disan linguo) during a 
23 According to Wang Xiaolong, China’s ambassador to Mongolia, there 
were nearly 1.3 million border crossings from Mongolia to China in 2012, 
and more than 6,000 Mongolian young people are studying in China.
24 “Speech by Xi Jinping on neighbourhood policy to the Working 
Conference on Neighbourhood Relations”, Xinhua, 25 October 2013, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878944.
htm.
25 The concept of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” was initially aimed at 
associating five Chinese provinces (Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and 
Xinjiang) with the countries of Central Asia. The provinces of Sichuan 
and Inner Mongolia and the municipality of Chongqing were subsequently 
added to the list, as was Mongolia. Three “roads” encapsulate the 
concept: road transport infrastructure and logistics; oil and gas transport 
infrastructure; and the development of the transnational economy.
Over the past three years, 
Mongolia has been reaching 
out to potential third 
neighbours in an attempt 
to “diversify” its diplomatic 
partners. Mongolia wants to 
remain “non-aligned” and 
“intermedial” in its foreign 
policy.
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to China’s national security. And because it is extremely 
dependent on the Chinese economy, Mongolia cannot turn 
its back on Beijing to prioritise relations with Washington 
and Tokyo. Wei and Xia say that Mongolia is trying to 
use its non-alignment to position itself as a mediator in 
northeast Asia. Mongolia is, for example, working to solve 
the North Korea problem through its special relationship 
with North Korea and its promotion of the Ulan Bator 
dialogue mechanism (乌兰巴托对话机制, Wulanbatuo 
duihua jizhi). Mongolia’s neutral position enables it to 
seem not to be in China’s camp, but at the same time it 
allows China to support Mongolia’s initiatives. Mongolia’s 
President Elbegdorj became in October 2013 the first head 
of state to visit Pyongyang after Kim Jong-un’s accession 
to power, although he did not actually meet the new North 
Korean leader. Some commentators have noted the content 
of Elbegdorj’s speech at Kim Il-Sung University, in which he 
talked about human rights and regime legitimacy, economic 
liberalism, and Mongolia as a “nuclear-free zone”.29 Others 
point out the lengths to which Kim Jong-un went to avoid 
meeting the Mongolian president before meeting Xi Jinping, 
so as to avoid upsetting his Chinese neighbour. Kim Jong-
un’s visit to China has not yet taken place. 
The year 2014 marks the 65th anniversary of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
Mongolia, and it has been declared the “year of friendship 
with Mongolia” in China. It represents an opportunity for 
the two countries to extend their strategic partnership. 
Mongolia seems more than ever to be an almost perfect 
neighbour – even if it remains a little too independent for 
China’s complete comfort.
29 The Mongolian President even said that “no tyranny lasts forever. It is 
the desire of the people to live free that is the eternal power.”
visit to Mongolia in 1991. Ever since, Mongolian diplomats 
have used it to refer to any relationship between Mongolia 
and a country other than China or Russia. Over the past 
three years, Mongolia has been reaching out to potential 
third neighbours.26 Yan Xiaodong says the strategy signals 
Mongolia’s attempt to “diversify” (多元化, duoyuanhua) 
its diplomatic partners. Mongolia wants to remain “non-
aligned” (不结盟, bu jiemeng) and “intermedial” (等距离, 
deng juli) in its foreign policy.27
Several of the writers raise concerns about Mongolia’s 
efforts to reach out to third neighbours. The writers are 
afraid that Mongolia will become linked to what they see 
as an “anti-China” front. US-Mongolia relations were 
given new energy by the historic visit of US President 
George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to 
Mongolia in November 2005. As part of its “pivot” to Asia, 
the Obama administration sent Vice President Joe Biden 
to visit Mongolia in August 2011, and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton came to Mongolia in July 2012. Economic 
cooperation between the US and Mongolia is virtually 
non-existent and military cooperation is limited to the 
annual UN and NATO Khaan Quest training exercises. But 
the US regularly underlines the importance of promoting 
democracy and basing cooperation on democratic values. 
Writers such as Chen Xiangyang have interpreted this US 
values-based offensive as an effort to contain China.28
Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, has taken steps to build 
closer relations with Mongolia through his Erch initiative 
(the word erch means vitality in Mongolian). In March 
2013, Abe visited Ulan Bator and stressed the importance 
of bilateral cooperation, especially in the energy sector. 
Japan is the leading provider of development assistance to 
Mongolia. It wants to develop a trilateral political dialogue 
between Japan, Mongolia, and the US, based on the idea 
that the three countries form a community of values. The 
Ta Kung Pao article criticises this Japanese activism, as 
well as the visits to Japan in September 2013 of Mongolian 
Prime Minister Altankhuyag and President Tsakhiagiin 
Elbegdorj. The author believes that Japan wants to use 
Mongolia to “contain” (围堵, weidu) China. Yan Xiadong 
thinks Mongolia is developing new “security pillars” 
(安全支柱, anquan zhizhu) to protect itself from Chinese 
and Russian interference. Yan says that China must at all 
costs make sure that Mongolia’s diplomacy does not “push 
Russia back to the north and contain China in the south” 
(北抑俄罗斯、南遏中国, bei yi Eluosi, nan e Zhongguo).
Even so, Mongolia does not in itself represent a threat 
26 In 2012, for example, Mongolia became the 57th member of the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OCSE) and also 
one of NATO’s “global partners”.
27 In July 2010, Mongolia’s parliament adopted a new national strategy 
vision reaffirming its commitment to the basic principles of the country’s 
diplomatic policy. 
28 In an article published on the CICIR website in August 2012. See 
Chen Xiangyang, “Three obstacles to a deepened cooperation in East 
Asia”, Renmin Luntan – People’s Forum, 7 August 2012, available at
http://www.cicir.ac.cn/chinese/newsView.aspx?nid=4001.
